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In examining government expenditure,  we  surmised  from  fragmentary 
evidence that government spending was more likely to display a rural rather 
than an urban bias. In the absence of  more detailed data, disproportionate 
weight was given to the budget allocations for fertilizer subsidies, irrigation 
projects,  rural  school programs,  the INPRES village programs,  and  food 
subsidies. Because of  better data,  stronger evidence could be  garnered to 
support  the  hypothesis  that  budget  allocations  were  more  sensitive  to 
inter-island equity. There is in fact evidence that  inter-island equity takes 
precedence over rural-urban equity. This is consistent with  our conjecture 
that the concern for rural development stems more from a desire to eradicate 
poverty than to narrow the rural-urban gap. 
The analysis of this chapter sets the stage for our forthcoming discussion 
on the importance of  political factors in determining the debt outcome. To 
the  extent  that  people  are  consistent  in  their  actions,  the  fact  that  the 
technocrats support, and Soeharto approves of, a fiscal  policy which favors 
the tradable sector means that they would also advocate a similarly-oriented 
exchange  rate  policy.  We  will  show  in  chapter  6  that  exchange  rate 
management has been tempered by political considerations, and will quantify 
in  chapter 8 that this exchange rate policy resulted in Indonesia avoiding a 
debt crisis during 1982-84. 
5  Monetary Policy and Financial 
Structure 
5.1  Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the conduct of monetary policy 
and the development of  the financial sector since  1966. Along  with other 
economic  measures,  financial  policies  have  been  actively  used  by  the 
government to pursue its macroeconomic objectives. During the period  of 
prosperity  in the  1970s, mainly  due to the two oil booms in that  decade, 
there was no incentive for the government to reform the underdeveloped tax 
and  banking  systems  which  were  inherited  from  the  Dutch  colonial 
administration. Major reforms to the financial system in  order to mobilize 
domestic saving were initiated only after the bust of the second oil boom. In 
contrast to the  1966-67  reforms which accomplished a total turnaround of 
the  economy  in  a  relatively  short  period  of  time,  recent  reforms  cannot 
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5.2  Performance of Monetary Policy in the 1970s 
As  we  mentioned  earlier,  the  balanced  budget  policy  of  the  Soeharto 
government  effectively  ended  the  creation  of  money  to  finance  budget 
deficits.  This did  not  mean, however,  that  monetary  creation  in the  1970s 
was truly independent of  the state of  the government budget. This is because 
the money stock was also affected by changes in the foreign asset position of 
the central bank, Bank Indonesia. This balance-of-payments  linkage to the 
monetary  supply  was  what  made the  stance  of  monetary  policy  move  in 
tandem with that  of  fiscal policy.  As will  be explained, when  fiscal policy 
was  expansionary  in the  wake of  the  two oil  booms,  it  induced  monetary 
policy  to be  expansionary  too. The result  was  a  big  inflation  spurt in  the 
1970s that  had nothing  to do with  money-financing  of  government budget 
deficits,  but  rather  with  the  lack  of  instruments  to  end  the  balance- 
of-payments linkage between government spending and the money supply. 
Prior to the introduction of ceilings on lending by the banking  system in 
April  1974, the main instrument  for monetary control was the extension of 
central  bank  credits  to  the  banking  system,  state enterprises, and  private 
companies. Since the  central  bank  credits  were  extended for a contracted 
time  period,  the  government  was  not  in  a  position  to  engineer  quick 
increases or reductions of the money stock. This reserve method of monetary 
control  was  shown  to  be  grossly  inadequate  for  stabilizing  the  economy 
when a large fiscal stimulus occurred, financed by increases in oil revenue. 
The reason  for the  synchronization  of  fiscal  and monetary  policy  during 
the 1970s lies in the balance of  payments. With the rapid development of the 
oil  sector  since  1970, government revenue  from oil  accelerated  (see table 
5.1). It climbed from Rp 99 billion  in  1970 to Rp 141 billion  in  1971, and 
then to Rp 231 billion in 1972 oil revenue was actually denominated in U.S. 
dollars).  Since the primitive nature of  the Indonesian  financial system ruled 
out  the  possibility  of  open-market operations, the  maintenance  of  a  fixed 
dollar-rupiah  exchange rate  meant  that  the conversion of  oil  revenue from 
dollars to rupiahs  in order to finance the expanded government expenditure 
automatically increased the money supply. This is clearly seen in 1972 when 
oil  revenue  increased  by  90  billion  rupiahs  over  the  previous  year.  The 
conversion  of  this  oil  revenue  (231 billion)  led  to  a  122 billion  rupiah 
increase  in  the reserve  money  base  because  of  the  monetary  authorities’ 
inability to quickly sterilize the monetary consequences of  foreign-exchange 
market transactions to peg the value of the exchange rate. The 1972 growth 
rate  of reserve  money  was 46 percent  compared to the  29  percent  of  the 
previous two years. 
The price  of  oil  then  quadrupled at  the  end of  1973, encouraging the 
government to increase its spending.  In fact, the government augmented  its 
expenditure well  beyond  the  increase  in  oil  revenue.  This  was  possible 
because the creditworthiness of Indonesia soared along with the price of oil. 85  IndonesidChapter 5 
Table 5.1  Monetary Consequences of Changes in Official Foreign Asset Position 
Foreign Assets of  Change in=  Rate of  Growth of 
Central Bank 
Oil and  Budget  as Proportion  Reserve  Reserve 













































































































60.0%  57.8  17.4% 
29.4  36.6  12.3 
29.0  27.6  4.4 
45.7  48.6  6.4 
39.3  41.6  31.0 
56.8  40.4  40.6 
33.2  35.2  19.1 
21.9  25.7  19.8 
24.6  25.3  11.0 
9.6  24.0  8.1 
31.5  33.3  20.6 
36.2  51.1  18.5 
16.1  29.2  12.2 
4.8  10.0  9.5 
25.1  6.4  11.8 
11.0  13.3  10.5 
17.9  18.0  4.7 
21.6  14.9  5.8 
”In billions of  rupiahs. 
?he  low  ratio of  foreign assets to  total assets in  1975 is because of  the bailing out of  Pertamina by  Bank 
Indonesia. 
External  credit,  euphemistically  referred  to  as  “external  revenue,”  was 
pretty much available on demand. This is evident from the large jumps in the 
budget deficit; it rose from Rp 224 billion in 1974 to Rp 488 billion in 1975, 
and then to Rp 778 billion in  1976. The constantly  increasing amount of oil 
revenue caused the monetary authorities to lose control of the money supply. 
Reserve money grew 57 percent in  1974, and the inflation rate for that year 
was 41  percent.  The central  bank  responded  to this  monetary  anarchy  by 
setting lending ceilings on the banking system. 
The government  tried  to control  the  inflationary  effects of  this  massive 
foreign wealth transfer by increasing imports in order to reduce the inflow of 
foreign reserves.  Imports by the public  sector were increased by restructur- 
ing budgetary expenditures toward those which  were import-intensive. The 
private  sector  was  encouraged  to  import  more  through  a  general  tariff 
reduction and the removal of the ban  list. In addition, the government built 
up  stockpiles  of  imported  commodities  such  as  foodstuffs  and  basic 
materials. 
We want to emphasize that the expansion of  government expenditure was 
not in any way  a logical consequence of the balanced  budget practice.  The 
government  need  not  have  increased  expenditures  at  all;  it  could  have 
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increase  in  oil  revenue.  With  access  to  external  credit  markets,  the 
Indonesian balanced budget practice was neither a restraint on government 
spending nor a check on the growth of the money stock. The key point we 
want  to  make  from  the  1973-75  experience  is  not  that  the  increase  in 
government spending was undesirable,  but that the instruments available for 
controlling monetary aggregates were grossly inadequate. Loan ceilings were 
a highly inefficient way to solve the problem. 
The need for better monetary instruments was again demonstrated in 1979 
and 1980 after the doubling of oil prices. The great inflow of oil revenue via 
the  balance  of  payments  caused  the  monetary  authorities  to  briefly  lose 
control of the money supply. Reserve money grew 32 percent in 1979 and 36 
percent in  1980, pushing  inflation up to 20 percent in these years. 
5.3  Financial Structure 
The structure of the organized financial system is shown in table 5.2.' The 
dominance of the banking  sector in the system is evident from the data. At 
the end of  1985 the banking sector (Bank Indonesia and commercial banks) 
held  more  than  90  percent  of  the  gross  assets  of  the  organized  financial 
system. 
Table 5.2  Structure and Growth of  the Organized Financial Sector, 197MQ 
Gross Assets  Annual Growth  Shares in 
Number in  (in billions of rupiahs)  of Assets (%)  Assets  (5%) 
1982  1986  1978  1982  1985  1978-82  1983-85  1978  1985 
Bank Indonesia  1  1 
Deposit money banks  113  113 
exchange banksb  15  15 
Other commercial banksC  50  59 
Development banks  28  28 
institutionsd  13  14 
National foreign 
Foreign banks  11  11 
Nonbank financial 
Savings banks'  33 
Leasing companies  34  73 
Other credit institutions'  -  20 
Insurance companies  83  - 





































26.4  19.3  48  38 
31.8  28.3  48  55 
32.6  27.6  37  43 
23.4  24.1  54 
29.5  48.1  24 
33.1  26.5  44 
42.6  37.1  24 
86.5  41.8  -  2 
35.0  9.5  1  I 
44.0  82.5  -  1 
14.6 
30.0  25.1  100  100 
-  __ 
Source:  Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial  Sfatisfics.  various issues. 
Note:  Dash indicates data were not available. 
"Annual compound rates. 
bFive state banks and ten national private banks. 
'National  private banks doing only domestic currency business. 
dNine investment finance, three development finance, and two other finance companies. 
'One  state savings banks and two private savings banks. 
'Village  banks,  rural paddy banks, and government-owned pawnshops. 87  IndonesidChapter 5 
About 70 percent of the assets and credit of the banking system are owned 
and  provided  by  the  seven state-owned banks,  including Bank  Indonesia 
itself.  Until  March  1984  Bank  Indonesia  provided  credits  directly  to 
economic  units,  particularly  to  state-owned  enterprises  and  to  quasi- 
government  institutions.  The  rest  of  the  bank  credit  is  divided  evenly 
between  the  foreign and joint  venture banks  and  about  seventy domestic 
private banks. The latter include twenty-seven Regional Development Banks 
(RDB)  owned  by  provincial  governments.  Each  province  has  an  RDB 
restricted to operating within its own jurisdiction.  In reality, RDBs operate 
like commercial banks. 
There are now twelve nonbank financial institutions (NBFI) operating in 
Jakarta, all established between 1972 and 1974. Nine of them are investment 
finance companies, and three are development finance corporations. The first 
type of NBFI acts as an intermediary and underwriter of  financial paper and 
finances medium- and long-term investments. The second type, development 
finance corporations, concentrates only on medium- and long-term financing 
and equity participation. 
The  state  commercial  banks  and  the  central  bank  are  the  majority 
shareholders of  nearly  all  NBFI.  The  minority  owners  are  domestic  and 
foreign private companies. An NBFI is required to have at least three foreign 
partners,  each  from  a  different  country,  with  at  least  one  partner  an 
investment  bank.  Bank  Indonesia  is  a  major  shareholder  in  two  of  the 
investment finance companies and in  all three of  the development finance 
corporations. 
The  investment  finance  companies  have  one  big  advantage  over  the 
commercial banks: they  are subject to only two regulations,  a debtlequity 
ratio  of  15  and  a  ceiling  on  foreign  borrowing.  The  absence  of  other 
regulations has permitted the investment finance companies to adapt more 
rapidly  and  effectively  than  the  banks  to  changes  in  the  economic 
environment. In  fact,  these companies were used  by  the  state banks and 
Bank Indonesia to extend credit and to invest in sectors and activities which 
banks could not service under the old credit regulations. 
The Jakarta stock market  started operations on 4 June  1952, but  it was 
closed in 1958 due to political and economic instabilities. It was reopened on 
10 August 1977. Trading has been virtually inactive. As of  September 1986 
there were  twenty-four equity  stocks and  three  bonds  listed  in  the  infant 
Jakarta stock exchange. Sixteen of the listed companies issuing equity shares 
were foreign companies and eight were domestic privately-owned firms. The 
companies issuing bonds were public enterprises. All of the new share issues 
took place during 1981-84.  The main motivation of foreign companies to go 
public  was  to  comply  with  the  “Indonesianization”  process  which  is 
required after operating for a certain period of time in the country. Through 
their overseas networks,these companies had access to international markets. 
They  really  did  not  need  to raise  money  in  the  small,  fragmented,  and 
high-cost Indonesian money market. In other words, raising capital was not 88  Wing Thye Woo and Anwar Nasution 
the main reason for foreign companies to issue equity  shares in the Jakarta 
stock exchange. Going public  for a foreign company was  like  “paying  an 
entrance fee” to the Indonesian market.  At the same time, these companies 
derived benefits from the tax concessions offered for going public under the 
1983 tax system. The tax benefits actually exceeded the value of the sale of 
shares! This tax concession has since been rescinded. 
On the supply side, there are many reasons why the supply of marketable 
securities is so limited in Indonesia. The government has never floated bonds 
in the domestic  market because  its budget  deficits since 1968 have  always 
been  financed  by  foreign aid  and  loans. Only four of the  220 state-owned 
enterprises  have  floated  bonds in  the Jakarta stock  exchange, and none of 
them has issued equity share. The capital needs of  these public enterprises 
have  been  financed  by  direct  government  investment,  foreign  loans,  and 
subsidized bank credit.  For domestic private companies, debt financing was 
less expensive relative  to the costs of raising and servicing  equity because 
credit  from the state banks  carrying subsidized  interest  rates  was plentiful 
and  could  be  easily  rolled  over.  During  the  period  of  high  international 
inflation rates and low nominal interest rates in the  1970s, it was not hard to 
tap  foreign  financial centers such  as Singapore and Hong Kong.  Working 
capital  could  be  obtained  by  issuing  promissory  notes  to  the  NBFIs 
(merchant banks). In a country where the data base on taxpayers is poor, tax 
administration  is  inefficient,  and  the  legal  and  accounting  systems  are 
underdeveloped,  tax evasion is an important source of  internal financing. For 
all  of  these  reasons,  the  opportunity  costs  of  going  public  (disclosure, 
regulation,  tax liability, dividend payout, dilution of ownership and control) 
for corporations is too high. 
On the demand side, the general public is still unfamiliar with the function 
of  modem  financial  institutions,  including  the  stock  exchange,  and  the 
benefits to be derived from them. This, and a history of  financial instability 
and repression,  have made investment in stocks unattractive.  An example of 
financial repression  in the Jakarta stock exchange is the excessive controls 
by  PT  Danareksa  (the National  Investment  Trust),  a  public  company,  in 
stabilizing  the  stock  prices.  In  order  to  avoid  large  capital  losses,  PT 
Danareksa stabilizes the share prices within  a narrow band (4 percent daily 
maximum variation) to make a share similar to a fixed price (fixed coupon) 
marketable asset like a time deposit or bond. 
5.4  Financial Repression of the 1970s 
The financial system in Indonesia was repressed for almost a decade after 
April  1974, up  until  the  financial  reforms of  June  1983. To  control  the 
increase  in  money  supply  resulting  from  monetization  of  government oil 
revenue denominated in dollars, Bank Indonesia set ceilings on bank credits 
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directly control the expansionary impact of the oil boom in the 1970s since a 
reserve  management  approach  was  shown  to  be  insufficient.  Then  the 
government realized  that  this  rationing method of  monetary  control could 
also be used to address several important items on its political agenda. 
Over time, Bank Indonesia was instructed to introduce detailed ceilings by 
type of  credit for each bank  through  an  extensive selective credit system 
featuring subsidized interest rates. For example, banks were assigned a civic 
function insofar as they restricted certain credit only to pribumis and made 
establishing  credit  for  them  a  priority  in  order  to  enhance  pribumi 
participation in economic activities. 
With  the  allocation  of  credit  in  mind,  the  Bank  of  Indonesia  set  up 
complicated rediscount financing, rediscount rates,  and  state banks’  loan 
rates.  For  Bimas  (a  government  rice-intensification program)  and  food- 
related activities, Bank Indonesia provided  100 percent of  the funds loaned 
by  state banks. For this rediscount financing the state banks act as agents of 
the  government  to  finance  its  program.  For  other  sectors,  rediscount 
percentages range from 20 to 80 percent of the state banks’ loans. The higher 
the priority of  the sector, the higher the percentage of  financing. (Discount 
facilities for nonpriority sectors were subsequently made available in January 
1978.) 
To  encourage state banks  to extend credit to  the  priority  sectors,  Bank 
Indonesia ensured them  adequate profits by  charging low  rediscount rates 
ranging  from  one-fourth  to  one-half of  their  loan  rates.  High  rediscount 
percentages and  low  rediscount rates increased the rate  of  return on state 
banks’ own funds. Because the discount facilities were primarily available to 
state banks, these facilities were another form of subsidy to their operations. 
The true subsidy was higher, taking into account the government’s share in 
the burden of  bad debts of  state banks. 
The bad-debt ratio of  state banks  was  quite high.  For  example,  of  the 
Bimas  loans  made  by  Bank  Rakyat Indonesia  (BRI) in  Java  (85  percent 
of  the  total  for  Indonesia) during  1970-74,  around  7  percent  remained 
unpaid two years after the loans were made. Loans were supposed to be due 
at most seven months from disbursement. The proportion of  unpaid debts 
rose to  13 percent for the  1974-75  crop and 22 percent for the  1975 dry 
season crop. Approximately Rp 7 billion (U.S. $17 million) was written off 
or rescheduled during 1974-77  because of crop failures. Risk-bearing in the 
Bimas loans was shared by Bank Indonesia and Bank Rakyat Indonesia (25 
percent  each) and  the  rest  (50 percent) by  the government.  According to 
Bank Bumi Daya’s 1976 annual report,  about 28  percent of  its loans were 
rescheduled and 8 percent had to be written off in that year. The Bank Bumi 
Daya  is  the  biggest  state  bank,  and  most  of  its  unrepaid  loans  were 
investment credits. 
Since most  priority  credits were  handled  by  state banks,  the  policy  of 
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banks  from  competition with  private banks.  In  addition,  state banks  and 
RDBs  are  depositories for  government  institutions  and  state  enterprises. 
Since they also have a wider network of  branch offices than private banks, 
state banks and RDBs have great advantages in tapping domestic savings. 
These institutional features discouraged competition,  preserved the  status 
quo, and guaranteed the dominant positions of the state banks. 
Discrimination in  access  to  Bank  Indonesia’s liquidity  credit  by  bank 
ownership has encouraged the banking system to hold excess reserves, both 
in  rupiah  and  in  foreign  currencies.  With  their  loans  financed  primarily 
through liquidity credit facilities, most of the funds generated by state banks 
contributed to excess reserves. With the secured loan refinancing, there was 
little need for state banks to mobilize domestic saving. On the other hand, 
savings were not  attracted to these banks where deposit rates were set by 
authorities at levels which usually lagged behind inflation. Many RDBs also 
had  excess  reserves.  The  excess  reserves  of  state  banks  and  RDBs, 
channelled through the interbank market in Jakarta,  have been an important 
source of funds for private banks and NBFIs. 
In theory such credit policies add to the distortion of  resource allocation 
and  preserve fragmentation in  the  financial  market  (see McKinnon  1973, 
Gablis  1977,  Nasution  1983).  An  extensive  ceiling  is  similar  to  credit 
rationing, i.e., a ceiling on what customers can borrow, regardless of  their 
willingness to pay higher interest rates. It is hard to judge whether Indonesian 
authorities succeeded in allocating credit according to their original design. 
For  one  thing,  there  are  no  detailed  data  on  how  credit  was  allocated 
according to various government objectives or a scale of priorities. Second, 
there were too many simultaneous objectives the government had wanted to 
achieve with the selective credit policy: to redress racial, sectoral, firm size, 
and technological imbalances; to equalize distribution of  income,  increase 
employment,  stabilize prices  of  basic  commodities;  and  so forth.  If  not 
accompanied  by  other  policies,  these  objectives  were  not  likely  to  be 
achieved since their number is much greater than the number of instruments 
available to use in pursuing them. For example, without any talent, skills, or 
experience,  a  person  cannot be  turned  into an  entrepreneur overnight by 
credit provision alone. Also, real resource allocation might not be similar to 
the credit allocation. 
In order for selective credit policies to be effective, the degree of  banks’ 
credit  fungibility  would  have  to  be  zero.  This  means  that  long-  and 
short-term  credits  from  the  banking  system  are  exclusively  utilized  by 
business  firms  to  finance  fixed  assets  and  working  capital,  respectively. 
Fungibility  in  this  context  is  defined  as  the  ability  of  business  firms  to 
borrow credits for a particular purpose but to effectively use it for another. 
Another type of  fungibility is when business firms use low-cost funds from 
the banking system to finance (bank-) approved uses, thereby releasing their 
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availability of  bank credit. For example, BRI provides low-interest credits 
for the purchase of hand tractors, and a farmer who receives such credit uses 
it for that purpose and uses his own funds to buy a color TV set. Although 
easily evaded by  big borrowers such as Pertamina and  the multinationals, 
credit ceilings are thought to have contributed to slowing the rate of growth 
in the Indonesian money supply (Amdt 1979). 
There is one extremely interesting puzzle in the credit ceiling experience, 
and most of the answers to it are rather damning to the dominant presence of 
the government in the financial sector. The puzzle is that state banks, unlike 
the private banks, seldom used up all of their prescribed ceilings and had to 
lend out their excess reserves in the interbank market. 
One can speculate, first, that the demand was actually high but bad bank 
practices by  the state banks made them unable or reluctant to reach out to 
small customers because it involved cumbersome operations and low profit 
per customer. Second, it could be  the inability of  the officers of  the state 
banks  to  select  projects  which  were  acceptable both  economically  and 
politically. Third, the officers may  have demanded too high side payments 
from prospective borrowers (to divide the implicit rents from a negative, 
zero, or low real interest rate). It has been suggested that the graft could have 
been as high as 15 percent of the volume of  the loan granted (Gray  1979). 
This would have resulted in  the real cost of  interest rates from state banks 
becoming too high either for prospective borrowers or to be competitive with 
interest rates at private banks. If  the interest rates at state and private banks 
were about equal, borrowers would have preferred to borrow from the latter, 
especially from branches of foreign banks or NBFIs, to avoid long delays 
and harassment from state banks. All of these factors could have reduced the 
rate of growth of credit expansion to less than the permissible ceiling without 
necessarily satisfying demand. 
5.5  Financial Sector Reform in the 1980s 
A series of  negative external shocks began in  1982. The world recession 
and the first wave of weakness in the world oil markets was worse than had 
been expected. Economic recovery in the OECD countries since 1983 does 
not  appear to have  helped economic growth in  Indonesia significantly. The 
price of oil dropped from $35 per barrel in  1982 to $25 in 1985, and then to 
$12 in  1986 (figure 5.1). This dismal picture was repeated for the prices of 
Indonesia’s nonoil exports. The worst is still to come. Nonoil export prices 
are  expected to  continue falling, bottoming out only  in  1988 when  they 
would  be 25  percent of  the  1982-84  level (figure 5.2). The decline in the 
terms of  trade has been  aggravated by  the sharp currency realignment in 
1985-87.  Most of Indonesian exports are priced in terms of the U.S. dollar, 
but a large proportion of its imports and foreign debts are denominated in the 
appreciating  currencies.  The  dollar  depreciation  worsened  the  current 92  Wing Thye Woo and Anwar Nasution 
account  deficit,  added to the burden  of  foreign  debts, and  cut Indonesia’s 
real budgetary expenditures.  The decline in the terms of trade plus the big 
reduction  in  government  real  nondebt  budgetary  expenditures  produced  a 
sharp decline  in  economic  growth. The annual  average  real  GDP growth 
since 1982 has declined to one-third to one-half of the level in the  1970s. In 
short, the end of the oil boom in 1982 made financing the investment-saving 
and foreign exchange gaps much harder. 
In  response  to  the  external  shocks,  the  government  adopted  several 
economic programs, among which was an overhaul of the financial structure. 
The financial reforms since  1 June 1983 fall into two major categories.  The 
first category comprises partial deregulation of  interest rates, elimination of 
credit ceilings,  and  reduction  in the  scope of  Bank  Indonesia’s  subsidized 
credits  to  state-owned  banks.  The second  category  consists  of  piecemeal 
measures. Direct Bank Indonesia intervention in the day-to-day operation of 
state  banks  was  reduced  significantly,  and  its  direct  lending  to  quasi- 
government bodies  and state-owned enterprises  was replaced  by  state bank 
lending financed by Bank Indonesia’s liquidity credits. 
At  present  there  is  no  treasury  debt  that  can be  used  for open market 
operations because the government financed its budget deficits solely through 
foreign  aid  and  foreign  loans.  To  increase  the  number  of  central  bank 







40  44  48  52  56  60 64  68 72  76  80  84  88 
Year 
1979-1981  =  100 
Fig. 5.2  Primary product prices. Index of  nonoil commodities (in constant 
dollars). 
Debt Certificates (SBI) in February 1984 and introduced the Money Market 
Instruments (SBPU) on 28 January 1985.* 
The SBI had  first been issued on  12 March  1970. However, issue ceased 
during the oil boom era in the 1970s as the authorities encouraged banks to 
invest their excess reserves in foreign assets in order to sterilize the inflow of 
oil  money. At  the  beginning  the  interest rates on SBIs were  set by  Bank 
Indonesia at levels higher than the rates paid on excess reserves held at the 
central bank, but over time the sales of  SBIs shifted to an auction system. 
Since 1984 the frequency of  SBI auctions has increased, and rediscounting 
can be done either at Bank Indonesia or at Ficorinvest, an investment finance 
type of NBFI largely owned by Bank Indonesia. Bank Indonesia guarantees 
to rediscount the SBIs at their original auction prices,  irrespective of  their 
remaining maturities. Despite promotional efforts by  Bank Indonesia, SBIs 
are not yet well accepted by  the financial sector. The SBIs can be resold to 
the  nonbank  public.  So  far,  however,  the  secondary market  for  SBIs  is 
nonexistent.  To  maximize  their  profit  from  holding  SBIs,  financial 
institutions usually purchase a large volume of long-maturity SBIs and hold 
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SBPUs are contingent liabilities of  the bank of NBFI that first endorsed 
them.  There are three types of  SBPUs,  namely:  (1) promissory notes  by 
eligible  banks  and  NBFIs;  (2)  promissory  notes  issued  by  customers  of 
eligible  banks  and  NBFIs  when  borrowing  from  them;  and  (3) bills  of 
exchange issued by third parties and endorsed by  eligible banks and NBFIs. 
Initially  the  maturity  of  SBPUs  was  set  between  one  to  three  months. 
However, on  7 August  1985 the upper limit was raised to six months.  In 
reality, 98 percent of  the SBPUs are in  the form of promissory notes with 
maturity dates ranging form one to fourteen days. Only institutions which 
have  signed repurchase contracts with Ficorinvest are eligible to endorse an 
SBPU. The repurchase contract prescribes the upper limit of each institution 
in rediscounting SBPUs. 
There are no data available on the total volume of  SBPUs in  circulation. 
However, the growth in the market for SBPUs must have been rapid since 
there is a high rate of  growth of  Bank Indonesia’s claims on banks arising 
from the use of the central bank’s rediscount facility on these instruments. 
As it now stands, the SBPU system is only beneficial for large financial 
institutions, especially the foreign exchange banks.  Its eligibility standards 
discriminate against small private banks whose customers are mainly small 
and medium-sized firms. It is also discriminatory against unit banks which 
operate outside the capital city, since Ficorinvest has no branch office outside 
Jakarta. 
5.6  Evaluating the 1983 Financial Sector Reform 
Our first observation is that the financial instruments SBI and SBPU still 
do not provide sufficient control over monetary  aggregates. This is clearly 
seen in the way that the money supply had to be contracted in response to a 
speculative run on the rupiah in the first half of 1987. Capital flight began in 
earnest in the second quarter of  1987 when a higher than expected current 
account deficit was reported.  (This overreaction was mostly due to nervous 
bankers  and  investors who had  suffered losses in  the two  closely spaced 
devaluations of  May  1983 and September 1986.) In June  1987 the minister 
of  planning,  Dr.  Sumarlin,  after  concluding that  open  market  operations 
would  not  be  able  to  raise  interest  rates  quickly  enough,  ordered  state 
enterprises to  withdraw  Rp  1.3 trillion  from  state banks to  be  placed  in 
central bank se~urities.~  This action, together with the sale of Rp 800 billion 
of open market instruments to banks during the month, sharply reduced bank 
liquidity and forced the banking system to sell its foreign assets in order to 
meet  rupiah  funding  requirements.  Other  domestic  corporations  began 
repatriating  capital  to  meet  current  operating  needs.  This  severe  credit 
squeeze succeeded in  convincing private agents that  the government was 
prepared  to  adjust  other  policies  in  order  to  ensure  the  viability  of  the 
existing exchange rate,  and the speculation against the rupiah came to an 
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Our  second  observation  is  that  the  response  of  long-term  financial 
intermediation to liberalization of  the financial sector is a slow one, and its 
initial reaction may even be perverse. While the response by depositors has 
been very favorable, the response by  financial institutions has not been so. 
The volatility of  sources and costs of  funds forced the banking industry to 
adjust its lending terms in order to minimize interest rate risks. This resulted 
in  an increasing share of  short-term fixed rate assets and a large proportion 
of  credits  canying  adjustable  rates.  Since  interest  rate  volatility  also 
increases  borrowing  risks,  the  banks  have  become  more  cautious  in 
extending credit. 
The third observation we  want  to  make  is that the deregulation should 
have  been preceded by  institutional reforms in the state enterprise system. 
The bureaucratization of  the state-owned banks in the protected climate of 
past credit policy raised their overhead cost and subsequently their cost of 
intermediation.  High  arrears  in  all  sectors  and  all  credit  schemes  is  a 
reflection of  high credit risks which resulted from the inadequate selection 
and supervision of customers. These deficiencies were largely due to the fact 
that all of  their lending risks were passed on to the government. After the 
reforms,  the  opportunity  cost  of  funds  increased  while  the  cost  of 
intermediation and credit risks remained high. The high cost of  intermedia- 
tion  was  also  caused  by  the  state  banks being  prohibited  from  reducing 
personnel. These are additional reasons why the lending rates of  state banks 
rose after deregulation. 
Our fourth observation is that the initial balance sheet conditions of  the 
financial institutions should not have been  overlooked. The present newly 
competitive market requires capital bases stronger than those of many of the 
financial  institutions.  Due  to  the  past  credit  policy  of  subsidized interest 
rates, a large proportion of the assets of state-owned banks were extended at 
negative real interest rates. The weakness of  the capital base of the private 
national banks is clearly shown by  several recent bank failures. 
The final observation we want to make is that deregulation of the financial 
sector should have been accompanied by greater supervision of the banking 
system. The banking system is not insulated well enough in practice from the 
fortunes of individual clients. This is because the interconnections of family 
ownership closely link many of the private national banks to the performance 
of  sister  companies.  Indeed,  some  of  these  banks  have  been  established 
mainly to secure funds for the nonbank business ventures of  their owners. 
5.7  Concluding Remarks 
The emphasis on the development of  two open market instruments, SBI 
and  SBPU,  is  a  long  overdue  step  toward  better  control  over  monetary 
growth.  An  important obstacle  to  improved macroeconomic management 
seems to be that open market operations have been mainly geared to keep 
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external interest rate developments. One reason for the capital outflow prior 
to  July  1987 was  that  Bank  Indonesia had  kept  the  SBI rate  flat  for a 
relatively  long  period,  causing  domestic  interest  rates  to  diverge  from 
international  interest  rates.  In  a  financially  open  economy  like  that  of 
Indonesia,  it  is essential  to recognize  that  external  shocks will  frequently 
make tradeoffs among interest rate stability, domestic income stability, and 
exchange rate stability inevitable. 
It  is  clear from the manner in  which  the  monetary  contraction  of  June 
1987 had to be implemented that the market for both SBI and SBPU was still 
too shallow. It may be difficult to increase their role if the financial markets 
remain underdeveloped.  Financial deepening is an important priority, but not 
only  because  of  the  need  to  enhance  the  effectiveness of  the  monetary 
instruments.  Financial  deepening would  also better  mobilize  (and  maybe 
increase)  domestic  savings,  reduce  dependence  on  external  credit,  and 
improve the overall allocation of  capital within the economy. 
One of the first steps that could be undertaken to boost development of the 
financial sector would be to privatize some of the state enterprises. It would 
certainly ease Indonesia’s external debt burden if a minority portion of these 
state enterprises were sold to foreigners.  The possible  increase in efficiency 
of  these enterprises would be an added bonus. 
6  Exchange Rate Policy 
6.1  Introduction 
In chapter 3 we identified an important political constituency (technocrats, 
Javanese  peasants,  and  Outer  Island  residents)  which  is  opposed  to  the 
maintenance  of  an overvalued  exchange rate. We  will  show in this chapter 
that  this  constituency  has  been  successful  in  influencing  exchange  rate 
policy,  with  the  result  that  there  is  an  asymmetry  in  policy  response  to 
changes  in  the  balance  of  payments.  It  makes  good  economic  sense  to 
devalue the real exchange rate  when  a balance-of-payments  deficit  occurs, 
but due to the existence of this constituency it makes good political sense not 
to allow the real exchange rate to revalue  when  a surplus occurs. The fact 
that the institutional memory was impressed by the potency of the exchange 
rate in effecting economy-wide resource reallocation  and income redistribu- 
tion during the 1966 economic rehabilitation program helps to strengthen the 
economic argument  for  a  devaluation  whenever  the  balance-of-payments 
situation demands it. This exchange rate policy, as we will argue in chapter 
7,  played  a  crucial  role  in  helping  Indonesia  to  avoid  a  debt  crisis  in 